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Abstract
This paper provides a quantitative evaluation of the macroeconomic, distributional, and fiscal effects of three
reform proposals for Germany: i) a reduction in the social security tax in the low-wage sector, ii) a publicly
financed expansion of full-day child care and full-day schooling, and iii) the further deregulation of the
professional service sector. The analysis is based on a macroeconomic model with physical capital, human
capital, job search, and household heterogeneity. All three reforms have positive short-run and long-run
effects on employment, wages, and output. The quantitative effects of the deregulation reform are relatively
small due to the small size of the professional services in Germany. Policy reforms i) and ii) have substantial
macroeconomic effects and positive distributional consequences. Ten years after implementation, reforms
i) and ii) taken together increase employment by 1.6 percent, potential output by 1.5 percent, real hourly
pre-tax wages in the low-wage sector by 3 percent, and real hourly pre-tax wages of women with children by
2.7 percent. The two reforms create fiscal deficits in the short-run, but they also generate substantial fiscal
surpluses in the long-run. They are fiscally efficient in the sense that the present value of short-term fiscal
deficits and long-term fiscal surpluses is positive for any interest (discount) rate less than 9 percent.
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1. Introduction
At first sight, Germany looks like a model for economic prosperity: the unemployment rate
has dropped to 4.6 percent, the government budget is in surplus, and annual per capita
output growth has averaged 2.2 percent since the Great Recession.1 However, a second look
reveals two structural weaknesses. First, the dramatic ageing of the German population will
act as a severe drag on future economic growth and is bound to put strain on future gov-
ernment finances. Second, a large number of jobs in Germany are marginal jobs (so-called
mini-jobs) and part-time jobs that have low productivity and pay low hourly wages.2 In this
paper, we analyze reform proposals for Germany that can help overcome these two structural
weaknesses. Specifically, we consider structural reforms that not only boost output, employ-
ment, and hourly wages, but also generate fiscal surpluses in the long-run (fiscal efficiency).
In addition, we discuss the distributional consequences of the reform proposals.
We consider three reform proposals. First, we analyze a reform that reduces the social
security tax in the low-wage sector. This reform increases the incentive for unemployed
workers to engage in job search and it increases the incentive for marginally employedworkers
to search for part-time or full-time employment. Second, we consider a publicly financed
expansion of full-day child care and full-day school programs. This reform helps women
with children to balance work and family life, and it therefore increases their incentives to
move from marginal employment to part-time or full-time employment. Third, we study the
1The unemployment rate is the harmonized unemployment rate according to the OECD statistics in
2015. Note that in line with an exceptionally low unemployment rate, the employment rate in Germany is
quite high (74 percent in 2014 and in Q3 2015 according to OECD statistics). The budget surplus of the
German government amounted to 0.6 percent of GDP in 2015 according to the German Statistical Office
(Statistisches Bundesamt). The average growth rate of per capital output is computed for the 6-year period
2010-2015 using data from the German Statistical Office.
2In 2014, 22 percent of employment in Germany was part-time employment and 12 percent was marginal
employment (mini-jobs) according to the German Statistical Office. See Krebs and Scheffel (2015) for a
detailed discussion of the data on marginal employment and part-time employment.
1
further deregulation of the professional services (lawyers, accountants, architects, engineers)
in Germany. This reform enhances efficiency and improves productivity of firms using the
professional services as an input factor. Clearly, the first two reforms increase the supply of
labor, whereas the third reform increases the demand for labor.
Our analysis is based on simulations of a calibrated macroeconomic model with physical
capital, human capital, and job search (frictional labor market). Households are ex-ante
heterogenous differing with respect to their family type (single, couple, children) and the
education level of their adult household members. Households are also ex-post heteroge-
nous in the sense that unemployed workers engage in job search with uncertain outcome.
Similarly, a fraction of the marginally employed and part-employed workers desire to ex-
tend their working hours and search for full-time work, but the success of their search effort
is uncertain. Households make a consumption-saving decision and employed workers have
the opportunity to invest in their human capital through on-the-job-training. In line with
the empirical evidence, the model generates an endogenous wage penalty for marginal and
part-time employment since full-time employed workers have the largest incentive to invest
in on-the-job training. The final-goods sector is perfectly competitive and the intermediate-
goods sector (professional services) is imperfectly competitive with a mark-up that depends
on the level of regulation (entry barriers). The model economy is calibrated to match a
number of micro-level and macro-level facts of the German economy.3
The first reform proposal consists of a reduction in the employee contribution to the
social security tax for (most) workers with monthly earnings less than 2, 000 Euro. Currently
the employee contribution to the social security tax in Germany is 20 percent for monthly
3The model neglects several channels that could further increase the economic benefits of the three reform
proposals, and in this sense the results presented here provide a lower bound on the true benefits of reform.
Specifically, the analysis neither takes into account the effect of schooling on the human capital of children
nor does it allow for a labor-leisure choice along the intensive margin. Further, the macroeconomic model
analyzed here does not have a Keynesian aggregate demand channel.
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wages higher than 850 Euro, nothing (exemption) for monthly wages below 450 Euro (so-
called mini-jobs), and linearly increasing in the range between 450 Euro and 850 Euro.
We consider a reform that replaces the current social security tax system with a system in
which the employee contribution increases linearly with earnings reaching its maximal value
of 20 percent at monthly earnings of 2, 000 Euro. The reform reduces the social security
tax for full-time work in the low-wage sector and for the majority of part-time work, and
it increases the tax on marginal employment since it removes the tax exception for mini-
jobs. Thus, the reform gives marginally employed workers a stronger incentive to search for
part-time employment and full-time employment, and induces unemployed workers to search
harder for jobs since the average social security tax on employment is reduced.
The social security tax reform has positive macroeconomics effects that are quite sub-
stantial. Specifically, employment, wages, and output increase in the short-run and in the
long-run. Ten years after reform implementation, employment has increased by 0.8 percent,
average real hourly pre-tax wages have risen by 0.6 percent, and potential output has ex-
panded by 0.8 percent. The reform has also positive distributional consequences since pay
raises are concentrated in the low-wage sector. Ten years after the reform, real hourly pre-tax
wages in the low-wage sector have gained 1.7 percent. Finally, the fiscal implications of the
reform are positive. The reform generates a fiscal deficit of 0.4 percent of GDP in the first
year, yields a balanced budget 9 years after implementation, and produces fiscal surpluses
afterwards. For any real interest rate (discount rate) lower than 9 percent, the proposed
social security reform is fiscally efficient in the sense that the present value of fiscal deficits
and fiscal surpluses is positive. Put differently, from a fiscal point of view the reform yields
an internal rate of return of 9 percent.
The second reform proposal is a publicly financed expansion of full-day child care and
full-day school programs. Currently, only 40 percent of school children attend a full-day
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school in Germany and less than 40 percent of the children ages 3 to 6 attend a full-day
child care program. We consider a public program that expands access to full-day facilities
so that after the reform 80 percent of children in Germany attend full-day child care or
full-day schools. To achieve this goal, about 4 million half-day spots have to be transformed
into full-day spots. According to estimates in the literature, this expansion program will
create additional annual fiscal cost of about 6 Billion Euro (0.2 percent of German GDP),
mainly for teacher salaries, and a one-time fiscal cost of about 20 Billion Euro (0.66 percent
of German GDP), mainly for new buildings and other capital goods. This reform helps
women with children to balance work and family life, and increases their incentive to search
for work if unemployed or to search for work with longer work hours if already employed.
The expansion of full-day child care and full-day school programs has positive macroe-
conomics effects that are quite substantial. Employment, wages, and output increase in the
short-run and in the long-run. Ten years after the reform implementation, employment has
increased by 0.8 percent, average real hourly after-tax wages have risen by 0.4 percent, and
potential output has expanded by 0.7 percent. The reform has also positive distributional
consequences since pay raises are concentrated among women with children, a group that
traditionally has struggled with low hourly wages. Ten years after the reform, real hourly
wages for women with children have gained 0.8 percent. Finally, the fiscal implications of
the reform are positive. The reform generates initial fiscal deficits due to additional public
expenditures, but also generates additional tax revenues so that the government budget is
balanced after 4 years and in surplus thereafter. For any real interest rate (discount rate)
lower than 11.86 percent, the proposed public expansion program is fiscally efficient in the
sense that the present value of fiscal deficits and fiscal surpluses is positive. In other words,
this public investment program yields an internal rate of return of 11.9 percent for the
government.
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We also consider a reform package that combines the tax reduction program with the
expansion of full-day school/child care. Though the model underlying our analysis allows
for non-linear household behavior and non-linear interaction effects between labor, capital,
and goods markets, we find that the macroeconomic effects of the two reforms combined are
roughly the sum of the individual effects of the two reforms considered separately. In other
words, the combination of individual reforms to reform packages does not generate either
significant “crowding out” effects or positive spill-over effects. Specifically, 10 years after the
reform package has been implemented, employment has increased by 1.8 percent, average
real hourly after-tax wages have risen by 1 percent, and potential output has expanded by
1.5 percent. Further, though the reform package generates short-run fiscal deficits, it also
produces substantial fiscal surpluses in the long-run. For any real interest rate (discount
rate) lower than 9.4 percent, the proposed reform package is fiscally efficient in the sense
that the present value of fiscal deficits and fiscal surpluses is positive. Thus, the reform
package yields an internal rate of return of 9.4 percent for the government. Finally, the
reform package has positive distributional consequences in the sense that workers in the
low-wage sector and women with children experience substantial gains in hourly wages.
The third reform proposal is the further deregulation of the professional services (lawyers,
accountants, architects, engineers) in Germany. This reform enhances efficiency and im-
proves productivity of firms using the professional services as an input factor. We find that
the macroeconomic effects of this reform are positive in the short- and long-run, but quan-
titatively the effects are relatively small due to the small size of the sector of professional
services in Germany (around 3 percent of GDP). Specifically, 10 years after reform imple-
mentation, employment has increased by 0.02 percent, average real hourly after-tax wages
have risen by 0.15 percent, and potential output has expanded by 0.14 percent.4
4IMF (2014) considers a deregulation of the German service sector and finds positive output effects that
are much larger than the 0.14 percent we find here. However, the analysis in IMF (2014) assumes that the
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2. Model
This section develops the model and defines our equilibrium concept. The framework is based
on Krebs and Scheffel (2013), which combines the incomplete-market model with human
capital developed in Krebs (2003) with a search model along the lines of Ljungqvist and
Sargent (1998).5 For notational simplicity, we only discuss stationary equilibria (aggregate
ratio variables are constant over time). The definitions and results are, mutatis mutandis,
the same for non-stationary equilibria.
2.1. Goods Production
Time is discrete and open ended. We assume that there is one final good that can be
consumed or used for investment purposes. Production of this final good is undertaken by one
representative firm (equivalently, a large number of identical firms) that uses physical capital,
human capital, and j = 1, . . . , J intermediate good to produce the final good according to
the production function
Yt = AK
α1
t H
α2
t (M1t + . . .+MJt)
1−α1−α2 (1)
where Y is aggregate output, K is the aggregate stock of physical capital, H is the aggregate
level of human capital employed, and Mj is the quantity of intermediate goods j. Further,
A is an efficiency parameter measuring total factor productivity and α1 and α2 are param-
eters measuring the relative importance of physical capital, respectively human capital, in
production. Notice that the production function has constant-returns-to-scale, satisfies a In-
ada condition, and is continuous, concave, and strictly increasing in each argument. Notice
further that we assume for simplicity that the J intermediate goods are perfect substitutes.
deregulation reform can reduce markups substantially in the entire service sector, which comprises more
than half of the German economy, whereas the current paper considers the deregulation of the professional
service sector, which only comprises 3 percent of the German economy.
5An extensive literature review can be found in Krebs and Scheffel (2015).
6
The representative firm rents physical capital and human capital in competitive markets
at rental rates rk and rh, respectively. Note that rh is simply the hourly wage rate per unit of
human capital and that we dropped the time index because of our stationarity assumption.
In addition, the firm buys the intermediate goods at unit prices pj. The representative firm’s
profit maximization problem in each period t reads
max
Kt,Ht,M1t,...,MJt
{
AKα1t H
α2
t (M1t + . . .+MJt)
1−α1−α2 − rkKt − rhHt −
∑
j
pjMjt
}
(2)
The first order conditions with respect to the intermediate good Mj delivers the inverse
demand function Mjt =Mj(p1, . . . , pJ ,Kt,Ht) for intermediate good j.
Each intermediate good j is produced by one firm at constant marginal costs ν. There
is Bertrand competition such that for given inverse demand function, each firm chooses it
price level to maximize profits. Specifically, in each period t the intermediate good firm j
maximizes
max
pj
{
pjMj(p1, . . . , pJ ,Kt,Ht)− νMj(p1, . . . , pJ ,Kt,Ht)
}
(3)
For our quantitative policy analysis, we identify the intermediate-good sector with the sector
of “Professional Services” consisting of tax accountants, lawyers, engineers, and architects
(see Section 6).
2.2 Households
There are a large number of households who differ with respect to their family type s1.
There are six different family types, s1 ∈ {sn, ska, skn, cn, cka, kcn}, corresponding to the
types “single without school children (kids)”, “single with school children and access to
full-day school program”, “single with school children and no access to full-day school pro-
gram”,“couple without school children”, “couple with school children and access to full-day
school program”, and “couple with school children and no access to full-day school program”.
Households do not change their family type and in this sense s1 describes ex-ante hetero-
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geneity of households. The distribution of households over family types s1 is exogenous and
will be chosen to match the empirical distribution over family types – see the calibration
section for details.
Households also differ according to their employment status, s2. A single-household can
be short-term unemployed, s2 = su, long-term unemployed, s2 = lu, full-time employed,
s2 = 1e, part-time employed, s2 = 0.5e, or marginally employed, s2 = 0.25e. For the couple-
household the different employment states are defined as the combination of the employment
states of the two adult household members. The employment state of an individual household
changes over time and the associated stochastic process is a Markov process with stationary
transition function that depends on search effort, l, of the household. Specifically, households
can exert job search effort that determines the likelihood to transit to an employment state
with higher working hours, that is, an individual worker who is short-term or long-term
unemployed, s2 ∈ {su, lu}, can become employed and move to one of the employment states
s2 ∈ {0.25e, 0.5e, 1e}, a worker who is marginally employed, s2 = 0.25e, can move to one
of the two employment states s2 ∈ {0.5e, 1e}, and a worker who is part-time employed,
s2 = 0.5e, can transit to full-time employment, s2 = 1e. Full-time employed workers do
not search since the hourly wage per unit of human capital is common across jobs. We
assume that job search is undirected across different employment types (full-time, part-
time, marginal employment) in the sense that a worker/household in employment state s2
chooses one effort level l ∈ IR that determines the transition probabilities, pi(s′2|s2, l), to any
employment state, s′2 ≥ s2.
The hourly wage per unit of human capital of an employed member of the household is
subject to idiosyncratic risk. This risk is modeled as shocks to the individual stock of human
capital, η(s3), that follow an i.i.d. process. See below for the details how these shocks affect
the human capital of an individual household.
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For notational ease, we define the exogenous state of an individual household in period t by
st = (st1, st2, st3) and the corresponding transition probabilities by pi(st+1|st, lt). Households
die with constant and common probability ρ, in which case they are replaced by new born
households (perpetual youth model along the lines of Blanchard, 1987).
Households can invest in financial capital (save) and human capital (on-the-job training)
and we denote the level of financial capital, respectively human capital, of an individual
household by at (asset holding), respectively ht. Given an initial state, (h0, a0, s0), a house-
hold chooses a plan, {ct, lt, ht, at},6 that has to satisfy the budget constraint
(1 + τc)ct + xkt + (1− τxh)xht = (1− τa)rfat + (1 − τh(s1t, s2t))rhs2tht + tr(s1t, s2t)ht
ht+1 = (1− δh + η(s3t))ht + φxht (4)
at+1 = at + xkt
ht+1 ≥ 0 , at+1 + ht+1 ≥ 0
where the first equation in (4) is the sequential budget constraint, the second is the human
capital evolution equation, and the third is the evolution equation for financial assets (capi-
tal). In (4) the variable xkt denotes investment in financial capital (saving), rf is the return
to financial capital (the risk-free rate), xht is investment in human capital, φ a parameter
describing the productivity of human capital investment, δh is the (average) depreciation
rate of human capital, and ηt = η(s3t) a shock to human capital that captures wage risk.
The government system of taxes and transfers is defined by the labor income tax (including
social security tax), τh, the capital income tax, τa, the human capital investment subsidy, τhx,
the consumption tax, τc, and the transfer payments, tr(s3t). Note that both labor income
tax and transfer payments may depend on family type, s1, and employment status, s2. Note
further that rfat is the (pre-tax) capital income in period t and that rhs2tht is the (pre-tax)
6Here ct stands for the function mapping partial histories, st, into consumption levels ct(st), with similar
notation for the other household variables.
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labor income in period t. Finally, we note that the two inequality constraint in (4) impose
a debt constraint.
There are financial intermediaries that have the ability to transform one unit of financial
capital into one unit of physical capital at no cost. Profit maximization of these firms implies
the zero-profit condition rf = rk − δk, where δk is the depreciation rate of physical capital.
The budget constraint (4) assumes that physical capital and human capital are produced
using similar technologies in the sense that one unit of physical capital can be transformed
into φ units of human capital. Thus, we assume constant returns to scale at the household
level. This assumption, also made in Krebs (2003), implies that the household decision
problem displays a certain linearity with respect to physical capital investment and human
capital investment in the sense that goods invested in either human capital or physical
capital generate returns that are independent of household size, where size is measured by
total wealth (see below).7 In conjunction with the constant-returns-to-scale assumption for
the aggregate production function F it implies that the model exhibits endogenous growth.
The assumptions we make in (4) have the advantage that they keep the model highly
tractable, which, as we argued before, is essential for the quantitative analysis conducted in
this paper. Tractability in the general case requires that we do not impose a restriction on
the ability of households to decumulate human capital. However, in the calibrated model
economy used for our quantitative analysis, the restriction that human capital investment
is always non-negative, xh ≥ 0, is always satisfied in equilibrium; that is, it holds for all
household types and all realizations of uncertainty.8
7Note also that in (4) we focus on the resource cost of human capital investment, but we can easily
introduce time cost of human capital investment without loosing tractability.
8Note that in (4) we have explicitly imposed a non-negativity constraint on the stock of human capital,
and our general characterization of the household decision rule (proposition 1) holds with this constraint
imposed. Of course, for a certain range of parameter values this constraint binds in equilibrium, but for
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Households are risk-averse and have identical preferences that allow for a time-additive
expected utility representation. We also assume that utility is separable in consumption
and search effort, and that the current utility is given by u(ct, lt, st) = ln ct − d(lt, st),
where d(lt, st) is the disutility from search, a strictly increasing and strictly convex function.
Expected utility associated with a consumption-effort plan {ct, lt} reads
U({ct, lt}|s0) = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ln ct − d(lt, st)
)∣∣∣∣s0] (5)
where β = β˜ρ with β˜ the subjective discount rate and ρ the death probability. Note that the
expectation in (5) depends on the effort plan {lt}, but we will suppress this dependence for
notational ease. Note also that the disutility of search effort, d, may depend on household
type, s1, and employment status, s2.
Households choose a consumption-effort-investment plan, {ct, lt, ht, at}, to maximize ex-
pected lifetime utility (5) subject to the budget constraint (4).
2.3 Equilibrium
The initial distribution, µ0, of households over states, (h0, a0, s0), in conjunction with the
transition functions, pi(st+1|st, lt), and the equilibrium effort plans, {lt}, induce a sequence of
equilibrium joint distributions, {µt}, over (h0, a0, s0, st). Assuming a law of large numbers,
aggregate variables in any period t can be found by taking the expectation with respect to
the joint distribution µt. For example, the aggregate level of financial capital of households
in period t is Kt = E[at] and the aggregate level of employed human capital is Ht = E[s2tht]
In equilibrium, human capital demanded by the firm must be equal to the corresponding
aggregate stock of human capital supplied by households. Similarly, the physical capital
demanded by the firm must equal the aggregate net financial wealth supplied by households.
the parameter values used in our quantitative analysis this constraints never binds (does not bind for all
households types and uncertainty states).
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That is, in equilibrium we must have for all t
Kt = E[at] (6)
Ht = E[s2tht]
To sum up, we have the following equilibrium definition:
Definition A stationary (balanced growth) equilibrium is a pair of rental rates, (rk, rh), a
vector of intermediate good prices, (p1, . . . , pJ ), a sequence of physical and human capital
stocks, {Kt,Ht}, and a family of household plans, {ct, ht, at, lt}, such that
i) Utility maximization of households: for each initial state, (h0, a0, s0), and given rental
rate rh and interest rate rf = rk− δk, the household plan, {ct, ht, at, lt}, maximizes expected
lifetime utility (5) subject to the sequential budget constraint (4).
ii) Profit maximization of final-good firms: the sequence {Kt,Ht} solves problem (2)
iii) Profit maximization of intermediate-good firms: the price pj solves the problem (3) for
all j = 1, . . . , J .
iv) Market clearing: equations (6) holds for all t.
A stationary recursive equilibrium is a stationary equilibrium in which household plans
are generated by policy functions. Note that in a stationary equilibrium, the extensive-
form aggregate variables Kt, Ht, Mjt, Xkt, Xkt, and Ct all grow at a common rate and
the intensive-form aggregate variables (ratio variables) are constant over time – see the
equilibrium characterization below. Note further that the equilibrium growth rate of all
extensive-form aggregate variables is endogenous – see Krebs (2003) for a detailed discussion
of the equilibrium behavior of this class of endogenous growth models with idiosyncratic
risk.
In our definition of equilibrium, we have not included the government budget constraint.
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The government budget constraint reads:
τcE[ct] + rhE[τh(s1t, s2t)s2t)ht] + τarfE[at] = τhxE[xht] + E[tr(s1t, s2t)ht] (7)
In our policy analysis below, we impose the budget constraint for the pre-reform equilibrium,
but do not impose the constraint post-reform. This means that we assume that the govern-
ment can borrow and lend in international financial markets and uses this ability to finance
any reform-induced budget deficits and to invest any reform-induced budget surpluses. Note
that a standard argument shows that in an equilibrium with (7) the goods market clearing
condition (aggregate resource constraint) holds:
Ct +Xkt +Xht = Yt −
∑
j
Mjt (8)
2.4. Characterization of Household Problem
We next show that optimal consumption choices are linear in total wealth (human plus
financial) and portfolio and effort choices are independent of wealth. This property of the
optimal policy function allows us to solve the quantitative model, which has considerable
household heterogeneity and three inter-temporal choice variables (h, k, l), without using
approximation methods. The property also implies that the household decision problem is
convex and the first-order approach can be utilized.
To state the characterization result, denote total wealth (human plus financial) of a
household at the beginning of the period by wt =
1−τhx
φ
ht + at. Note that φ measures the
productivity of goods investment in human capital and 1/φ is the shadow price of one unit
of human capital in terms of the consumption/capital good. Denote the portfolio share of
physical capital by θt = at/wt. Note that this definition in conjunction with the definition
of w imply that the portfolio share of human capital is given by 1 − θt = (1−τhx)htφwt . The
sequential budget constraint (4) then reads:
wt+1 = (1 + r(θt, st))wt − ct (9)
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ct ≥ 0 , wt+1 ≥ 0 , 1− θt+1 ≥ 0
with
r(θt, st)
.
= θtrf + (1− θt)rˆh(st)
rˆh(st)
.
=
φ
1 − τhx [(1− τh(s1t, s2t))rhs2t + tr(s1t, s2t)] − δh + η(s3t)
Clearly, (9) is the budget constraint corresponding to an inter-temporal portfolio choice
problem with linear investment opportunities and no exogenous source of income, where the
return to physical capital investment (saving) is rf and the risky return to human capital
investment is rˆh(s). Note that these returns also depend on the tax and transfer system, a
dependence that we suppress for notational ease. Note also that the more time a household
spend working (the larger s2t), the higher is the return to human capital investment.
The representation of the household budget constraint shows that (w, θ, s) can be used
as individual state variable for the recursive formulation of the utility maximization prob-
lem. Specifically, the Bellman equation associated with the household utility maximization
problem is
V (w, θ, s) = maxc,w′,θ′,l
{
ln c− d(l, s) + β∑s′ V (w′, θ′, s′)pi(s′|s, l)} (10)
subject to w′ = (1 + r(θ, s))w − (1 + τc)c
where for simplicity we assume that the continuation value in the case of death is zero. We
have the following characterization result for the solution to the household decision problem.
Proposition 1. The value function and the optimal policy function are given by
V (w, θ, s) = V˜ (s) +
1
1 − β (ln(1 + r(θ, s)) + lnw)
c(w, θ, s) =
1− β
1 + τc
(1 + r(θ, s))w (11)
θ′(w, θ, s) = θ′(s)
l(w, θ, s) = l(s)
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w′(w, θ, s) = β (1 + r(θ, s))w
where the intensive-form value function, V˜ (s), the optimal portfolio choice, θ′, and the
optimal effort choice, l, are the solution to the intensive-form Bellman equation
V˜ (s) = max
θ′ ,l
{
− d(l, s) + ln 1− β
1 + τc
+
β
1 − β lnβ +
β
1 − β
∑
s′
ln(1 + r(θ′, s′))pi(s′|s, l) + β∑
s′
V˜ (s′)pi(s′|s, l)
}
(12)
Proof : The proof is an extension of the proof given in Krebs and Scheffel (2013).
The maximization problem (12) is a convex problem so that first-order conditions are
sufficient. Thus, to find the optimal portfolio and effort choice we can confine attention to
the first-order conditions with respect to the portfolio choice and search effort, which read
0 =
∑
s′
rˆh(s
′)− rˆk
(1 + r(θ′, s′))
pi(s′|s, l) (13)
∂d(l, s)
∂l
= β
∑
s′
(
ln(1 + r(θ′, s′))
1 − β + V˜ (s
′)
)
∂pi(s′|s, l)
∂l
Note that the first equation in (13) states that marginal utility weighted expected returns
on the two investment opportunities (human capital and financial capital) are equalized –
a standard optimality condition in portfolio theories (the marginal utility of future con-
sumption is equal to ((1 − β)(1 + r′)β(1 + r)w)−1 and therefore proportional to (1 + r′)−1).
Equation (13) in conjunction with equation (12) without the max operator determine the
equilibrium values of θ, l, and V˜ (.) for given rental rates rk and rh (partial equilibrium).
The first equation in (13) implies that in equilibrium part-time employed workers invest
less in human capital (less on-the-job training) than full-time workers. To see this, note
that the human capital return of part-time employed workers is less than the human capital
return of full-time employed workers, rˆh(s2 = 0.5) < rˆh(s2 = 1), since the additional labor
income generated by the human capital investment is smaller: 0.5 · rh · h < 1 · rh · h. Thus,
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part-time employed workers have a smaller incentive to invest in human capital than full-time
employed workers, and part-time jobs are therefore less productive, and pay lower hourly
wages, than full-time jobs. Clearly, the same argument implies that marginally employed
workers, s2 = 0.25, have the smallest incentive to invest in human capital and end up being
the least productive workers with the lowest hourly wages. These equilibrium properties are
essential for some of the results to follow and can be derived formally using the first equation
in (13). It is also in line with the empirical evidence – see our discussion of the empirical
literature in Section 3.6.
Equation (13) is also useful to discuss the direct effects of the two reforms that increase
labor supply. First, consider the effect of the reduction in the social security tax for workers
with low earnings. In this case, for the affected workers the after-tax hourly wage, (1 −
τh(s1, s2))rh, goes up. This has two consequences. First, unemployed workers have a stronger
incentive to search for a job and workers who are marginally or part-time employed have
a stronger incentive to search for a full-time job. Second, the return to human capital
investment goes up and the incentive of employedworkers to invest in human capital therefore
increases. As a result, search effort, l, goes up and investment in human capital, (1 − θ),
goes up. These two results can be formally shown using equation (13).
Consider now the second reform, the increase in public spending on schooling so that more
schools in Germany will offer a full-day school program. This reform changes the distribution
of households over s1. Specifically, after the reform a larger fraction of households with kids
have access to full-day school programs and members of those households who are not full-
time employed have a stronger incentive to search for full-time employment.
Proposition 1 provides a convenient characterization of the solution to the household
decision problem for given investment returns (partial equilibrium) and is useful for two
reasons. First, it reduces the problem of solving the Bellman equation (7) to the much
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simpler problem of solving the intensive-form Bellman equation (8). Second, it states that
the consumption and saving choices are linear in wealth, and that the portfolio and effort
choices are independent of wealth. This property allows us to solve for the general equilibrium
without knowledge of the endogenous wealth distribution. We next turn to the general
equilibrium analysis.
2.5. Equilibrium Characterization
In the previous section we characterized the solution to the household problem. Consider now
the maximization problem of the final-good producer (2) and intermediate-good producers
(3). For the intermediate good sector, we focus attention on symmetric equilibria, pj = p
and Xjt = Xt, for all j = 1, . . . , J . Using the first-order conditions associated with the
maximization problems (2) and (3) and the symmetry condition, in the Appendix we show
that the price for each intermediate good satisfies
p =
J
J − α1 + α2ν (14)
.
= (1 + ϕ(J))ν
where ϕ(J) = J
J−α1+α2 − 1 defines the mark-up. This mark-up is decreasing in the number
of firms, J , and therefore decreasing in the degree of competition in the intermediate-good
sector (i.e. the professional services). In Section 6, we discuss how the deregulation of the
market for professional services affects the economy by increasing the degree of competition,
J , and therefore decreasing the mark-up.
Using the pricing condition (14) and the first-order condition of the final-good producer,
we find the following relationship between rental rates rk and rh and the firm’s capital-to-
labor ratio K˜ = K
H
:
rk = α1 Aˆ K˜
1+
α1
α2 (15)
rh = α2AˆK˜
α1
α1+α2
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Aˆ
.
= A
1
α1+α2
(
1 − α1 − α2
(1 + ϕ)ν
)(1−α1−α2)/(α1+α2)
Equation (15) shows that a reduction in mark-up, ϕ, in the intermediate goods sector
is equivalent to an increase in productivity, Aˆ, in the final goods sector. Thus, a dereg-
ulation of the intermediate goods sector (professional services) that increases competition
and the number of competing firms J will reduce cost and increase effective productivity,
Aˆ in the final good sector, which in turn increases labor demand through (15). This is the
policy experiment analyzed in Section 6 when we consider the (further) deregulation of the
professional services in Germany.
To complete the equilibriumcharacterization, we define the share of aggregate total wealth
of households in state s as
Ω(s)
.
=
E [(1 + r)w|s] pi(s)∑
sE [(1 + r)w|s]pi(s)
where pi is the stationary distribution of the equilibrium transition function over s. Note that
(1+r)w is total wealth of an individual household after assets have paid off (after production
has taken place and depreciation has been taken into account). Note also that
∑
s Ω(s) = 1
by construction. Further, Ω is finite-dimensional, whereas the set of distributions over (w, s)
is infinite-dimensional. Using the wealth shares Ω, we show in the Appendix that the market
clearing condition (6) can be written as:
K˜ =
(1− τhx)∑s θ(s)Ω(s)
φ(1− θ(s))s2Ω(s) (16)
and that stationary Ω-distribution is the solution to
Ω(s′) =
ρ
∑
s pi(s
′|s, l(s))(1 + r(θ(s), s))Ω(s) + (1 − ρ)ψµnew(s′)
ρ
∑
s,s′ pi(s
′|s, l(s))(1 + r(θ(s), s))Ω(s) + (1 − ρ)ψµnew(s′) (17)
where µnew determines how the wealth of dying households is distributed among new-born
households and ψ < 1 is a parameter that measures the fraction of wealth that is passed on
to the new generation.
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Summing up, we have the following equilibrium characterization result:
Proposition 2. Suppose that (θ, l, V˜ , K˜,Ω) solve (12),(15), (16), and (17). Then the se-
quence {Kt,Ht} and the family of household plans, {ct, ht, kt, lt}, induced by (θ, l, V˜ , K˜,Ω)
together with the corresponding rental rates, (rk, rh) and inter-mediate goods prices (p1, . . . , pJ )
given by (14) define a stationary (balanced growth) equilibrium.
Proof . The proof is an extension of the proof given in Krebs and Scheffel (2013).
Proposition 2 shows that the stationary equilibrium can be found without knowledge
of the infinite-dimensional wealth distribution; only the finite dimensional distribution of
wealth across family types Ω matters. The is because the linearity of the policy functions in
wealth make the infinite dimensional distribution of wealth across households of a given type
irrelevant. Proposition 2 facilitates our quantitative analysis significantly since it implies that
there is no need to approximate an infinite dimensional distribution over financial wealth
and human wealth when computing equilibria.
3. Calibrating the Model
The calibration is based on macro- and microeconomic evidence from various sources. Specif-
ically, the cross-sectional distribution of households over family types and employment states
are taken from the 2010 Micro-census provided by the Federal Office of Statistics (Statis-
tisches Bundesamt). Data on labor market dynamics are generally taken from the Federal
Employment Agency (Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit) and policy variables, including benefits,
labor taxes and social security contributions are taken from the OECD Tax Benefit Model.
See Krebs and Scheffel for a detailed description of the data sources and a discussion of the
various empirical distributions.
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3.1 Search Technology and Transition Rates Across Employment States
We set the period length to one quarter. We use a standard convention and define long-
term unemployment as any unemployment spell that lasts longer than 12 months. Thus, we
choose pi(su|lu) = 0.25.
We assume an exponential specification for the probability of an unemployed worker
finding a job as a function of effort:
pi(s2 ∈ {1e, 0.5e, 0.25e}|su, l) = 1− e−λ(su)l (18)
pi(s2 ∈ {1.0e, 0.5e, 0.25e}|lu, l) = 1− e−λ(lu)l
In search models with only one employment state, the exponential formulation is often used in
the literature (Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997, Lentz, 2009, and Shimer and Werning, 2008).
Specification (12) is the generalization of this approach to the case of multiple employment
states if there is undirected search for different employment opportunities (full time, part
time, marginal employment). We choose the values λ(su) and λ(lu) so that the job finding
probabilities (12) match the corresponding quarterly job finding rates in 2010 provided by
the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit). In 2010, these quarterly job
finding rates were 0.36 for the short-term unemployed and 0.09 for the long-term unemployed.
Specification (18) determines the average job finding probability, but does not pin down
what type of job is found in case job search was successful (full time, part time, marginal
employment). We assume that the arrival rate of the different employment states is the
same:
pi(s2 = 1e|su, l) = pi(s2 = 0.5e|su, l) = pi(s2 = 0.25e|su, l) (19)
pi(s2 = 1e|lu, l) = pi(s2 = 0.5e|lu, l) = pi(s2 = 0.25e|lu, l)
This assumption can be easily relaxed from a modelling point of view, but we are not aware
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of any micro-level evidence that would allow us to calibrate the additional parameters of the
richer model structure. For this reason, we confine attention to specification (19).
There is little empirical evidence regarding the transition rates from marginal employ-
ment, s2 = 0.25e, to either part-time employment, s2 = 0.5e, or full-time employment,
s2 = 1e, and regarding the transition rate from part-time employment, s2 = 0.5e, to full-time
employment, s2 = 1e. Caliendo, Kuenn, and Uhlendorff (2012) show that the probability
of a marginally employed worker to move to a higher employment state (i.e. part-time or
full-time employment) is not different from the job finding rate of an unemployed worker.
Motivated by this evidence, we set the probability of moving from s2 = 0.25e to either
s2 = 0.5e or s2 = 1e equal to the job finding rate of a short-term unemployed worker. In
addition, we also set the probability of moving from s2 = 0.5e to s2 = 1e equal to the job
finding rate of short-term unemployed workers.
We choose the job destruction rates, i.e. the flow rates from the employment states
s2 = 1e, 0.5e, 0.25e to unemployment s2 = su, so that we match the empirical distribution
of households over employment states s2. In addition, we calibrate the transition rate from
long-term to short-term unemployment to match the composition of the unemployment pool
in the data. Specifically, conditional on the family and skill type, we target a value of 50
percent for the fraction of long-term unemployed workers in the pool of all unemployed
workers. The only exception are single parents, a group for which the large majority of
unemployed are long-term unemployed. In line with the data, for single parents we use a
share of 86 percent long-term unemployment as our target.
We also allow for one-step transitions from higher to lower employment levels, that is, we
allow for transitions from full-time employment to part-time employment (1.0e→ 0.5e) and
from part-time employment to marginal employment (0.5e → 0.25e). For lack of evidence,
we assume that for each family type these transitions rates are equal to the corresponding
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job destruction rates (i.e. the transition rate from the employment state to unemployment).
3.2 Search Preferences
We assume that disutility of search effort is
d(l, s1) = d0l
γ − d1(s1)
It is well-known that with the above specification the parameters λ(su) and λ(lu) and d0 are
not separately identified. We choose a numerically convenient normalization of d0 = 1. We
choose the curvature parameter γ to match a given value of the elasticity of the job finding
rate with respect to benefit payments for the short-term unemployed, where we choose as
target the micro elasticity holding constant the labor market state. This target elasticity is
chosen as follows.
For the US, there are a number of empirical micro studies estimating the search elasticity
directly. The best known studies are Moffitt (1985) and Meyer (1990) who estimate an
elasticity of around −0.9. Meyer and Krueger (2002) survey the literature and suggest an
elasticity of −1, whereas Chetty (2008) suggests a value of −0.5. Card et al. (2015) provide
new evidence using administrative data from the state of Missouri covering the period 2003-
2013. Based on identification coming from a regression kink design, they find an elasticity
of around −0.35 before the recession and an elasticity between −0.65 and −0.9 after the
recession. Krueger and Mueller (2010) analyze time use data and find that the level of
unemployment benefits has a large negative effect on the time unemployed workers spent
searching for a job, a finding that broadly supports the basic channel we emphasize in this
paper.
There is much less work on this issue for Germany. Hunt (1995) finds estimates for Ger-
many that are in line with the US estimates of Moffitt (1985) and Meyer (1990). Addison,
Centeno, and Portugal (2008), who use a structural search model and the European Com-
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munity Household Panel (ECHP), find values of the search elasticity ranging from −1.14 to
−1.66 for Germany. Consistent with this finding are the results reported in Hofmann (2012)
and Mueller and Steiner (2008) who find that imposing benefit sanctions/reduction long-term
unemployed for non-compliance has significant effects on the unemployment-to-employment
transition in Germany. With the exception of these last two studies, the empirical litera-
ture has focused on unemployed workers who are short-term unemployed according to our
definition (less than one year of unemployment). Guided by the evidence, for our baseline
calibration we choose a conservative value for the target elasticity of −0.7 for the short-term
unemployed.
For the disutility-term d1(s) we choose the specification d1(s) = d11(s1) + d¯12s2, where
s1 denotes the family type and s2 the employment status. We choose the value of d¯12
consistent with the disutility of work used in the RBC literature, e.g. Cooley and Prescott
(1995). We choose the values of d11(s1) to match the empirical ratio of full-time employment
to the sum of part-time and marginal employment for each family type s2. Note that this
approach ensures that the model matches the significant empirical difference in employment
type between women with kids who have access to full-day school and women with kids who
do not have access to full-day school. See Krebs and Scheffel (2015) for a detailed discussion
of the empirical evidence on this issue.
3.3 Wage Risk
One can show (Krebs 2003) that the assumption of i.i.d human capital shocks, η, implies
that the log of labor wages of individual households follows approximately a random walk
with innovation term  = (1 − θ)η. For the US, the random walk component of individual
labor income has been estimated by a number of empirical studies using data drawn from
the PSID, and estimates of σ for the US are in the range of .15 for annual wage changes,
which amounts to quarterly standard deviation of 0.15/2 = 0.075. For Germany, Krebs and
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Yao (2016) and Fuchs-Schuendeln, Krueger, and Sommer (2009) find similar values, and we
therefore choose this value as a target for σ.
3.4 Government Policy Parameters
We set the capital income tax at τk = 0.20, which is at the upper end of the range of
capital income taxes reported by the OECD. We set the schedule of labor income taxes and
social security contributions, τh(s1, s2), consistent with numbers computed from the OECD
tax calculator and the social security tax schedule. We choose the unemployment benefit
parameters that are a part of the transfer system, tr(s1, s2), to match the net replacement
rate for the short-term and long-term unemployed taken from Krebs and Scheffel (2013).
The remaining parameters of the transfer system are set so that the model’s implications for
labor income after taxes and transfers are consistent with the data drawn from the German
“Mikrozensus”. Finally, we choose the value of the consumption tax, τc, to ensure that the
government budget constraint is satisfied.
3.5 Production Technology
We set α1
α1+α2
to match the share of labor income in the data and 1 − α1 − α2 to match
the share of the sector professional services in the German economy, which is 3 percent.
We choose the remaining technology parameters to match capital-to-output ratio of 2.5, an
annual physical capital return of 4 percent and an annual average human capital return of
8 percent (human capital risk premium of 4 percent).
3.6 Implied Wage Differentials
As discussed in Section 2, the model implies that marginally employed workers have the
smallest incentive to invest in human capital (on-the-job training) and full-time employed
workers the largest incentive. As a result, marginally employed workers are the least produc-
tive workers and are paid the lowest hourly wage and full-time employed workers have the
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highest productivity and are paid the highest hourly wage. Thus, the model generates an en-
dogenous wage penalty for marginal employment and part-time employment. According to
the calibrated model economy, this wage penalty is 15 percent for marginal employment and
48 percent for part-time employment. This implication of the calibrated model is consistent
with the available empirical evidence in the following sense.
Data provided by the German Statistical Agency show that in 2014 the average hourly
wage of full-time employed workers was 23 percent higher than the average hourly wage for
part-time workers (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2014). Data drawn from the SOEP for the year
2010 show an average part-time wage penalty of 22 percent (Brenke, 2012). For marginally
employed workers the wage penalty is even larger: the average hourly wage of full-time
employed workers is 93 percent higher than the average hourly wage of workers whose only
job is a so-called mini-job (Eichhorst et al. 2012), which is the relevant group for calibrating
the model. Thus, the data indicate a substantial wage penalty for part-time work and a very
large wage penalty for marginally employed workers.
The above numbers are simple averages and do not take into account that observed
wage differentials between full-time work and part-time work or mini-jobs might be due
to differences in worker characteristics (education, experience) or firm characteristics (firm
size) or labor market characteristics (sector, occupation). There is a substantial amount of
empirical work on the part-time wage penalty for US workers (Hirsch, 2005, Moffitt, 1984)
and also British workers (Ermisch and Wright, 1993, and Manning and Petrongolo, 2008).
The results of this literature can be summarized as follows. First, there is a large unadjusted
wage penalty for part-time workers (20-30 percent) that is larger for men than for women.
Second, controlling for worker, firm and labor-market characteristics roughly halves the part-
time wage penalty. For Germany, the study by Wolf (2002, 2010) finds that, in line with
the international evidence, after controlling for worker and firm characteristics the part-time
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wage penalty is 11 percent for women and 25 men. Unfortunately, there is no empirical work
on the wage penalty for marginally employed workers, but extrapolation from the results on
part-time work would suggest that the adjusted wage penalty is about half of the unadjusted
wage penalty (i.e. half of 93 percent).
4. Reform of Social Security Taxes for Low-Wage Jobs
4.1 Current Situation
In Germany, the social security system covers public pension, health insurance, unemploy-
ment insurance, accident/disability insurance, and elderly nursing care insurance. The total
social security contributions from employers and employees add up to roughly 40 percent
of earnings for monthly earnings exceeding 850 Euro, where the employee contribution is
slightly less than 20 percent and the employer contribution is somewhat higher than 20
percent. For all monthly earnings below 450 Euro (marginal employment also called mini-
jobs), there is no employee contribution to social security. For monthly earnings between
450 Euro and 850 Euro, the employee contribution increases linearly with earnings. See
Figure 1 for a graphical representation of the employee contribution to the social security
tax in Germany. The limit of the amount of earnings subject to social security taxation, the
so-called contribution and benefit base, is 72, 600 Euro for West Germany and 62, 400 for
East Germany.
Labor income taxes (excluding the social security tax) are relatively low for workers with
monthly wages less than 2,000 Euro. For example, for a single person without children
(highest tax burden) monthly earnings of up to 700 Euro are exempt from income tax,
and the average income tax rate is 11 percent for monthly earnings of 1, 500 Euro and 15
percent for monthly earnings of 2, 000 Euro. Thus, for low-wage jobs, the social security tax
dominates the labor income tax, and any tax reduction program that wants to target the
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low-wage sector has to focus on the social security tax. Such a reform of the social security
tax will be discussed next.
4.2 Reform Description
We consider a reform that replaces the current social security tax system with a system in
which the employee contribution increases linearly with earnings reaching its maximal value
of 20 percent at monthly earnings of 2, 000 Euro. See Figure 1 for a graphical representation
of the effect of the reform on the employee contribution to the social security tax. To
implement the reform, we use micro-level earnings data and first compute for every family
type s1 and employment state s2 the reform-induced average change in the social security
tax for workers of a given family type and employment status. We then feed these changes
into the calibrated model and compute the equilibrium effects.
To gain a better understanding of the reform effects discussed below, Table 1 shows
the average change in the social security tax for marginally employed workers (mini jobs),
part-time employed workers, and full-time employed workers (averaged over all workers of
all family types). The reform substantially lowers the social security tax for many part-
time and full-time employed workers, and increases the social security tax for marginally
employed workers since it removes the tax exemption for mini-jobs. Thus, the reform will
give marginally employed workers a stronger incentive to search for part-time employment
and full-time employment. Further, unemployed workers will on average search harder for
jobs since the average social security tax on employment is reduced (the population weighted
average in Table 1 is negative).
4.3 Results
The macroeconomic, distributional, and fiscal effects of the reform are shown in Table 2
and Figures 2 - 6. Figure 2 shows that the reform leads to a substantial reduction in the
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unemployment rate: the unemployment rate falls by 0.08 percentage points in the short-run
(in the first year), by 0.25 percent in the medium run (after 5 years), and by 0.30 percent in
the long-run (after 10 years). The intuition underlying the decline in the unemployment rate
is simple. The reduction in the social security tax increases the attractiveness of work rela-
tive to unemployment, which improves search incentives and therefore induces unemployed
workers to increase their search effort. An improvement in search effort, in turn, increases
job finding rates and reduces unemployment.
Figure 3 shows the time path of employment after the reform. Employment increases by
0.22 percent in the first year, 0.72 percent after 5 years, and 0.87 percent after 10 years.
Less than half of the increase in employment is caused by the reduction in unemployment
depicted in figure 2. The rest is explained by an increase in full-time employment relative
to marginal employment (part-time employment remains roughly constant – see figure 3).
There is a simple reason behind the increase in full-time employment relative to marginal
employment: the reform reduces the social security tax for most full-time employed workers
in the low-wage sector, but increases the social security tax for the marginally employed – see
table 1. Thus, the reform increases the incentive for marginally employed workers to look
for full-time employment, and the transition rate from marginal employment to full-time
employment (and part-time employment) goes up.
We next turn to a discussion of the wage effect of the reform. There are three forces
that act upon hourly pre-tax wages. First, the increase in labor supply tends to reduce
wages because the marginal product of labor is diminishing in employment. Second, the
reform-induced increase in employment increases the marginal product of capital, which
induces firms to increase their labor demand – this force tends to push up wages. In a
standard neoclassical model with frictionless labor markets and fixed human capital, the
negative wage effect dominates in the short-run and the two effects cancel each other out
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in the long-run. However, the current model assumes a frictional labor market with search
unemployment and the employment adjustment therefore takes time (see figures 1 and 2).
In addition, there is a third effect on wages because workers invest in their human capital
(on-the-job training) and the incentive to invest in human capital is stronger for full-time
employed workers than for marginally employed workers – see also our discussion in Section
2.4. Thus, this third effect tends to push up hourly wages since the reform increases the
share of full-time employed workers relative to marginally employed workers (see figure 3).
Figure 4 depicts the development of hourly pre-tax wages after the reform (relative to
trend wage growth). The graph shows that the net effect on wages is positive in the short-
run and in the long-run. In other words, the two positive effects on hourly wages discussed
in the preceding paragraph dominate the negative effect on wages. Specifically, hourly pre-
tax wages increase by 0.15 percent in the short-run, by 0.42 percent in the medium run,
and by 0.63 percent in the long-run. Figure 4 also shows that the reform has desirable
distributional consequences in the sense that the rise in wages is concentrated in the low-
wage sector. Specifically, hourly pre-tax wages in the low-wage sector increase by 0.40 in the
first year, by 1.13 percent after five years, and by 1.71 percent after 10 years.9
Figure 5 shows the time path of output after the reform (relative to trend output growth).
There are three reasons why the reduction in the social security tax considered here will
raise output. First, the employment increase discussed above increases output. Second, the
physical capital stock increases, which increases labor productivity and therefore output.
Third, the human capital stock increases because marginal employment is replaced by full
employment, which increases labor productivity and therefore output. Figure 5 shows that
the output effects are substantial: output increases by 0.26 percent in the short-run, by 0.63
9We follow the standard approach and define low-wage sector as all workers whose monthly (pre-tax)
earnings is below 2/3 of the monthly median earnings. We compute these numbers based on the model
distribution.
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percent in the medium run, and by 0.82 percent in the long-run.
Finally, in Figure 6 we turn to the fiscal effects of the reform. Without adjustment of
labor or capital, the tax reduction program generates a fiscal deficit due to forgone tax
revenues. However, the reform-induced increase in employment and hourly wages discussed
above raises tax revenues. Figure 6 shows that in the first year the negative fiscal effect
dominates and the reform generates a fiscal deficit of 0.39 percent of output. However,
the increase in tax revenues generated by the expansion in employment and hourly wages
increases over time, and this increase is strong enough so that after 9 years the fiscal budget
is balanced and generates surpluses thereafter. In other words, after 9 years the economy
is on the upward-sloping part of the Laffer-curve. For any real interest rate less than 9.02
percent, the reform is fiscally efficient in the sense that the present value of fiscal deficits
and fiscal surpluses is positive. Put differently, this reform yields an internal rate of return
of 9.02 percent for the government.
5. Public Expansion of Full-Day School Programs
5.1 Current Situation
In Germany, only one third of schools offer some version of full-day school program, and two
thirds of schools are half-day schools – dismissal of school children is at 1 pm or earlier. If
we add other types of after-school programs not offered by the school itself, then at best 40
of the school children in Germany can take advantage of a full-day (i.e. until 4 pm) school
program. In contrast, around 80 percent of women with children in Germany would like
their children to attend a full-day school (Klemm, 2014). This indicates that there is a large
demand for public full-day schools in Germany that is not satisfied. The situation is similar
for child care programs for children ages 3− 6: less than 40 percent have access to a full-day
program, but a large majority of women with children would like to use a full-day child care
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program. See Krebs and Scheffel (2015) for a detailed discussion of the evidence on this
issue.
5.2 Reform Description
We consider a publicly financed expansion of full-day schools from the current status quo,
in which 40 percent of children have a full-day spot, to a situation in which 80 percent
of children have a full-day spot. We also assume that for children ages 3 − 6 a similar
expansion in full-day spots takes place in child care centers. To achieve this goal, about 4
million half-day spots in schools and child care centers have to be transformed into full-day
spots (Klemm, 2014). The annual running cost of this expansion program is about 6 Billion
Euro per year (0.2 percent of German GDP), where the largest part of this cost is wages
for teachers/educators.10 In addition, there is a one-time (sunk) cost for initial investment
in school buildings and other capital goods, which we assume to be 20 Billion Euro (0.66
percent of GDP). See Krebs and Scheffel (2015) for a detailed discussion of the costs of
transforming half-day spots into full-day spots. This program will increase (female) labor
supply in the sense that unemployed or marginally employed women with children will have
a stronger incentive to search for part-time or full-time employment. See our discussion of
this effect in Section 2.4.
5.3 Results
The macroeconomic, distributional, and fiscal effects of the public expansion program are
shown in Table 3 and Figures 7 to 11. Figure 7 shows that the reform leads to a substantial
reduction in the unemployment rate: the unemployment rate falls by 0.11 percentage points
in the short-run (in the first year), by 0.33 percent in the medium run (after 5 years), and
by 0.38 percent in the long-run (after 10 years). The intuition underlying the decline in the
10We assume that this cost is 0.2 percent of GDP in all future years, which means that we assume that it
rises in step with the growth of GDP.
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unemployment rate is simple. The expansion of full-day school programs by the government
improves the family situation for many unemployed women with children. These women will
increase their search effort, which increases job finding rates and reduces unemployment.
Figure 8 shows the time path of employment after the reform. Employment increases by
0.23 percent in the first year, 0.79 percent after 5 years, and 0.95 percent after 10 years.
About one half of the increase in employment is caused by the reduction in unemployment
pictured in figure 7. The other half is explained by an increase in full-time employment
relative to marginal employment (and part-time employment – see Figure 8). There is a
simple reason behind the increase in full-time employment relative to marginal employment.
For many marginally employed women with children, the reform improves their ability to
combine family with work and a significant fraction of these women begin to search for
part-time work or full-time work. This, in turn, leads to an increase in the transition rate
from marginal employment to part-time and full-time employment, and an increase in the
transitions from part-time employment to full-time employment.
We next discuss the wage effect of the reform. As in the case of the tax reduction analyzed
in the previous section, there are three forces that act upon hourly pre-tax wages. First,
the increase in labor supply tends to reduce wages because the marginal product of labor is
diminishing in employment. Second, the reform-induced increase in employment increases
the marginal product of capital, which induces firms to increase their labor demand – this
force tends to push up wages. In a standard neoclassical model with frictionless labor markets
and fixed human capital, the negative wage effect dominates in the short-run and the two
effects cancel each other out in the long-run. However, in the current model the labor market
has search frictions and the employment adjustment therefore takes time (see Figures 7 and
8). In addition, there is a third effect on wages because workers invest in their human capital
(on-the-job training) and the incentive to invest in human capital is stronger for full-time
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employed workers than for marginally employed workers – see also our discussion in Section
2.4. Thus, this third effect tends to push up hourly wages since the reform increases the
share of full-time employed workers relative to marginally employed workers (see Figure 8).
Figure 9 depicts the development of hourly pre-tax wages after the expansion of public
full-day school programs (relative to trend growth). The graph shows that the net effect
on wages is positive in the short-run and in the long-run. In other words, the two positive
effects on hourly wages discussed in the preceding paragraph dominate the negative effect on
wages. Specifically, hourly wages increase by 0.12 percent in the short-run, by 0.38 percent
in the medium run, and by 0.40 percent in the long-run. Figure 9 also shows that the reform
has desirable distributional consequences in the sense that the rise in wages is concentrated
among women with children, whose hourly wage is significantly lower than the average wage
of all workers. Specifically, hourly wages for women with children increase by 0.25 in the
first year, by 0.59 percent after five years, and by 0.84 percent after 10 years.
Figure 10 shows the time path of output after the reform (relative to trend growth). There
are three reasons why the reform considered here will raise output. First, the employment
increase discussed above increases output. Second, the physical capital stock increases, which
increases labor productivity. Third, the human capital stock increases because marginal
employment is replaced by full employment, which increase labor productivity and therefore
output. Figure 10 shows that the output effects are substantial: output increases by 0.22
percent in the short-run, by 0.52 percent in the medium run, and by 0.67 percent in the
long-run.
Finally, in Figure 11 we turn to the fiscal effects of the expansion of full-day child care and
full-day schools. Without adjustment of labor or capital, the reform generates a fiscal deficit
due the public expenditure associated with the expansion of full-day programs, which has
two components: an annual running cost of 0.2 percent GDP (salaries of teachers/educators)
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and a one-time (sunk) cost for initial investment in school buildings and other capital goods
of 0.66 percent of GDP. However, the reform-induced increase in employment and hourly
wages discussed above raises tax revenues. Figure 11 shows fiscal cost and benefits. In the
first few years, the negative fiscal effect dominates, but the increase in tax revenues generated
by the expansion in employment and hourly wages is strong enough so that after 4 years the
fiscal budget is balanced. In other words, after 4 years the economy is on the upward-sloping
part of the Laffer-curve. For any real interest rate less than 11.86 percent, the reform is
fiscally efficient in the sense that the present value of fiscal deficits and fiscal surpluses is
positive. Put differently, this public investment program yields an internal rate of return of
11.86 percent for the government.
6. Deregulation of the Professional Services
6.1 Current Situation
In Germany, the professional services (lawyers, accountants, architects, engineers) produce
about 3 percent of GDP. Further, more than 90 of these services are produced for upstream
firms, that is, these services are mainly intermediate goods. Until the 1990s the professional
services in Germany were heavily regulated, but a number of deregulation reforms led to
substantial improvements. However, even though there have been improvements, the current
level of regulation in Germany is only in line with the EU average and is still much heavier
than the regulation levels in the UK or Netherlands – see Krebs and Scheffel (2015) for
a detailed description of the German professional service and a survey of the literature.
Further, the average profit margin for the professional services in Germany is 24 percent,
which is roughly in line with EU-average, but significantly larger than the profit margin
for professional services in Netherlands (8 percent) and also significantly larger than the
profit margin in other knowledge-intensive service sectors in Germany (16 percent). Overall,
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the available evidence indicates that current profit levels in the professional service sector
in Germany still contain a substantial mark-up component (i.e. rent), and that further
deregulation of this sector would lead to a reduction in mark-ups and a corresponding increase
in production efficiency.
6.2 Reform Description
We consider a de-regulation of the professional services in Germany that reduces the OECD-
regulation index from its current value of 2.65 to a value of 1.65, which corresponds to a
reform that reduces the distance between regulation in Germany and regulation in the two
best-performers UK and Netherlands by half (Krebs and Scheffel, 2015). Based on empirical
evidence between the relationship between the OECD regulation index and mark-ups, such
an improvement in the regulatory framework is expected to reduce the by 4 percentage points
– see Krebs and Scheffel for a detailed discussion. As discussed in Section 2.5, the reduction
in mark-ups is formally equivalent to an increase in total factor productivity in the final
goods sector, which in turn increases labor demand. We next analyze the economic impact
of this deregulation reform.
6.3 Results
The results are shown in Table 4 and Figures 12 to 16. Figure 12 shows that the reform
leads to a modest reduction in the unemployment rate: the unemployment rate falls by 0.01
percentage points in the short-run (in the first year), by 0.02 percent in the medium run
(after 5 years), and by 0.02 percent in the long-run (after 10 years). The intuition under-
lying the decline in the unemployment rate is simple. The deregulation of the professional
services reduces the input cost for the producers of final goods, which is equivalent to an
increase in total factor productivity in the final goods sector – see Section 2.5 for the formal
argument. The productivity increase in turn leads to an increase in labor demand and a
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corresponding increase in hourly wages (see below), which improves search incentives and
reduces unemployment.
Figure 13 shows the time path of employment after the reform. Employment increases
by 0.01 percent in the first year, 0.02 percent after 5 years, and 0.02 percent after 10 years.
About one half of the increase in employment is caused by the reduction in unemployment
pictured in Figure 12. The other half is explained by an increase in full-time employment
relative to marginal employment (part-time employment remains roughly constant – see
Figure 12). There is a simple reason behind the increase in full-time employment relative
to marginal employment. The reform increases hourly wages by a constant amount for
all types of employment, which implies that the gain for full-time employed workers is on
average four times larger than for marginally employed workers. Thus, the attractiveness of
full-time employment relative to marginal employment increases, and this to higher search
effort among the marginally employed and a corresponding increase in the transition rate
from marginal employment to full-time employment (and part-time employment).
We next turn to a discussion of the wage effect of the reform. As already mentioned,
the reform increases total factor productivity and therefore hourly wages. This is a short-
run effect. In addition, there are two long-run effects that push up hourly wages. First,
the increase in employment shown above increases the marginal product of capital, which
induces firms to increase their labor demand. Second, workers invest in their human capital
(on-the-job training) and the incentive to invest in human capital is stronger for full-time
employed workers than for marginally employed workers – see also our discussion in Section
2.4. Thus, this effect also pushes up hourly wages since the reform increases the share of full-
time employed workers relative to marginally employed workers (see Figure 13). Figure 14
depicts the development of hourly wages after the reform (relative to trend growth). Hourly
wages increase by 0.13 percent in the short-run, by 0.14 percent in the medium run, and by
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0.15 percent in the long-run.
Figure 15 shows the time path of output after the reform (relative to trend output growth).
There are four reasons why the reform considered here will raise output. First, the increase
in total factor productivity increases output. Second, the employment increase discussed
above increases output. Third, the physical capital stock increases, which increases labor
productivity. Finally, the human capital stock increases because marginal employment is
replaced by full employment, which increase labor productivity and therefore output. Figure
15 shows that the cumulative output effect of the reform is relatively modest, but somewhat
larger than the increase in employment: output increases by 0.13 percent in the short-run,
by 0.14 percent in the medium run, and by 0.14 percent in the long-run.
Finally, in Figure 16 we turn to the fiscal effects of the reform. The reform increase tax
revenues in the short-run and in the long-run. Specifically, the fiscal surplus generated by
the reform is 0.00 percent of GDP in the short-run, 0.01 percent in the medium run, and
0.01 percent in the long-run.
7. A Reform Package
In this section, we consider a reform package that combines the tax reduction program with
the expansion of full-day school/child care. Table 5 summarizes the results. Though the
model underlying our analysis allows for non-linear household behavior and non-linear in-
teraction effects between labor, capital, and goods markets, we find that the macroeconomic
effects of the two reforms combined are roughly the sum of the individual effects of the two
reforms considered separately. In other words, the combination of individual reforms to re-
form packages does not generate either significant “crowding out” effects or positive spill-over
effects. Specifically, 10 years after the reform package has been implemented, employment
has increased by 1.78 percent, average real hourly after-tax wages have risen by 1.01 percent,
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and potential output has expanded by 1.46 percent. Further, the reform package generates
a balanced budget after 7 years and produces a fiscal surplus of 0.11 percent of GDP after
10 years. For any real interest rate (discount rate) lower than 9.37 percent, the proposed
reform package is fiscally efficient in the sense that the present value of fiscal deficits and
fiscal surpluses is positive. Thus, from a fiscal point of view the reform package yields an
internal rate of return of 9.37 percent. Finally, the reform package has positive distributional
consequences in the sense that the low-wage sector and women with children experience the
largest gains wages: hourly pre-tax wages increase by 3.08 percent in the low-wage sector
and by 2.68 percent for women with children.
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Table 1: Reform of Social Security Taxes for Low-Wage Jobs
change in average social security tax
full-time employment −0.92%
part-time employment −1.73%
marginal employment +1.90%
Table 2: Social Security Taxe Reform
after . . .
. . . 1 year . . . 5 years . . . 10 years
change of full-time equivalent jobs1
full-time employment 0.221 0.723 0.869
part-time employment 0.016 0.077 0.109
marginal employment −0.031 −0.123 −0.157
net effect 0.206 0.677 0.821
change of unemployment2
unemployment −0.075 −0.245 −0.297
change of hourly pre-tax wages1
average hourly pre-tax wages 0.149 0.420 0.634
hourly pre-tax wages in low-wage sector 0.401 1.134 1.712
change of gdp3
gdp 0.264 0.632 0.824
change of government outlays3
tax revenues −0.396 −0.157 −0.001
unemployment benefits −0.009 −0.020 −0.022
net effect −0.388 −0.137 0.021
Fiscal Efficiency
internal rate of return: 9.020 percent
1 in percent
2 in percentage points
3 in percent of gdp
Table 3: Public Full-Day School Program
after . . .
. . . 1 year . . . 5 years . . . 10 years
change of full-time equivalent jobs1
full-time employment 0.234 0.793 0.954
part-time employment −0.024 −0.061 −0.062
marginal employment −0.012 −0.058 −0.078
net effect 0.198 0.675 0.813
change of unemployment2
unemployment −0.108 −0.329 −0.381
change of hourly pre-tax wages1
average hourly pre-tax wages 0.121 0.280 0.400
hourly pre-tax wages for women with kids 0.253 0.588 0.839
change of gdp3
gdp 0.217 0.523 0.673
change of government outlays3
tax revenues 0.091 0.218 0.271
unemployment benefits −0.015 −0.031 −0.033
cost −0.660 −0.200 −0.200
net effect −0.554 0.049 0.104
Fiscal Efficiency
internal rate of return: 11.858 percent
1 in percent
2 in percentage points
3 in percent of gdp
Table 4: Deregulation of Professional Services
after . . .
. . . 1 year . . . 5 years . . . 10 years
change of full-time equivalent jobs1
full-time employment 0.005 0.019 0.023
part-time employment 0.000 0.001 0.001
marginal employment 0.000 0.000 −0.000
net effect 0.006 0.020 0.024
change of unemployment2
unemployment −0.007 −0.020 −0.023
change of hourly pre-tax wages1
average hourly pre-tax wages 0.129 0.140 0.145
change of gdp3
gdp 0.127 0.137 0.142
change of government outlays3
tax revenues 0.003 0.007 0.009
unemployment benefits −0.001 −0.002 −0.002
net effect 0.004 0.009 0.011
Fiscal Efficiency
internal rate of return: N/A
1 in percent
2 in percentage points
3 in percent of gdp
Table 5: Reform Package (Social Security Tax and Public Full-Day School Program)
after . . .
. . . 1 year . . . 5 years . . . 10 years
change of full-time equivalent jobs1
full-time employment 0.457 1.499 1.786
part-time employment −0.008 0.012 0.036
marginal employment −0.044 −0.181 −0.231
net effect 0.404 1.330 1.591
change of unemployment2
unemployment −0.182 −0.556 −0.647
change of hourly pre-tax wages1
average hourly pre-tax wages 0.268 0.685 1.005
hourly pre-tax wages in low-wage sector 0.821 2.100 3.082
hourly pre-tax wages for women with kids 0.713 1.825 2.679
change of gdp3
gdp 0.479 1.133 1.455
change of government outlays3
tax revenues −0.308 0.050 0.253
unemployment benefits −0.024 −0.049 −0.052
cost −0.660 −0.200 −0.200
net effect −0.485 −0.101 0.105
Fiscal Efficiency
internal rate of return: 9.369 percent
1 in percent
2 in percentage points
3 in percent of gdp
Figure 1: Social Security Tax Reform
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Figure 2: Unemployment Rate (Social Security Tax Reform)
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Figure 3: Employment: Full-Time Equivalent Jobs (Social Security Tax Reform)
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Figure 4: Hourly Pre-Tax Wage (Social Security Tax Reform)
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Figure 5: Output (Social Security Tax Reform)
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
years
ch
an
ge
 in
 p
er
ce
nt
Figure 6: Fiscal Effects (Social Security Tax Reform)
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Figure 7: Unemployment Rate (Public Full-Day School Program)
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Figure 8: Employment: Full-Time Equivalent Jobs (Public Full-Day School Program)
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Figure 9: Hourly Pre-Tax Wage (Public Full-Day School Program)
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Figure 10: Output (Public Full-Day School Program)
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Figure 11: Fiscal Effects (Public Full-Day School Program)
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Figure 12: Unemployment Rate (Deregulation of Professional Services)
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Figure 13: Employment: Full-Time Equivalent Jobs (Deregulation of Professional Services)
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Figure 14: Hourly Pre-Tax Wage (Deregulation of Professional Services)
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Figure 15: Output (Deregulation of Professional Services)
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Figure 16: Fiscal Effects (Deregulation of Professional Services)
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